Got Controversy - Milk Does by McCabe, Margaret Sova
University of New Hampshire
University of New Hampshire Scholars' Repository
Law Faculty Scholarship University of New Hampshire – School of Law
Fall 2008
Got Controversy - Milk Does
Margaret Sova McCabe
University of New Hampshire School of Law, margaret.mccabe@law.unh.edu
Follow this and additional works at: https://scholars.unh.edu/law_facpub
Part of the Dairy Science Commons, Food and Drug Law Commons, Large or Food Animal and
Equine Medicine Commons, and the Other Food Science Commons
This Article is brought to you for free and open access by the University of New Hampshire – School of Law at University of New Hampshire Scholars'
Repository. It has been accepted for inclusion in Law Faculty Scholarship by an authorized administrator of University of New Hampshire Scholars'
Repository. For more information, please contact ellen.phillips@law.unh.edu.
Recommended Citation
Margaret Sova McCabe, "Got Controversy - Milk Does," 13 DRAKE J. AGRIC. L. 475 (2008).
File: McCabe MACRO Final.doc Created on: 11/16/2008 11:45:00 AM Last Printed: 1/3/2009 12:21:00 PM 
475 
GOT CONTROVERSY?  MILK DOES 
Margaret Sova McCabe 
I. Introduction .......................................................................................... 475 
II. Why Do Consumers Care? A Short History of rBST, 1987-2007 ....... 478 
A. 1987 – 1994:  FDA Approval ......................................................... 479 
B. 1995, Challenging the Science:  Stauber v. Shalala ....................... 480 
C. 1996 Commercial Speech (Round One):   
 Int’l Dairy Foods Ass’n v. Amestoy .............................................. 483 
D. 1994 to Present:  Producers Safe Harbor –  
 FDA Milk Label Guidance ............................................................ 485 
E. 2006 -2008, The rBST-free Market Emerges .................................. 486 
III. False and Misleading? Federal Trade Commission Actions ................ 488 
IV. Safe or Not?  Food and Drug Administration Petition ........................ 490 
V. Commercial Speech, Round Two:  Current Legislation and  
 Rulemaking .......................................................................................... 492 
VI. Got Solutions?  Regulators and Industry Should ................................. 494 
 
I. INTRODUCTION 
Or more narrowly stated:  milk labels do.1  Between February 2007 and 
April 2008, milk labeling was the subject of a Federal Trade Commission com-
plaint,2 a Food and Drug Administration petition,3 legislation in two states,4 ad-
 _________________________  
  Margaret Sova McCabe is a Professor of Law at Franklin Pierce Law Center in 
Concord, New Hampshire.  For thoughtful comment, encouragement, and insight, I thank my col-
leagues Sophie Sparrow, Chris Johnson, and Tom Field.  For her capable research assistance, I am 
grateful to Natalia Pence.  I also thank Pierce Law for its support of my interest and work in agri-
cultural and food law. 
 1. Milk (dairy) is a highly-regulated market, primarily by the USDA, Agricultural 
Marketing Service.  That market‘s history is beyond the scope of this article, which focuses on 
consumer demand for rBST-free milk.  Readers interested in U.S. dairy regulation will find helpful 
information at http://www.ams.usda.gov. 
 2. Complaint at 1, FDA Matter No. 072-3480 (Feb. 27, 2007), available at http://www. 
ftc.gov/os/comments/monsanto/070227letterMonsantorBST.pdf. 
 3. Petition for Labeling of Products Produced with Posilac, FDA Docket No. 2007P-
0059 (Feb. 20, 2007), available at http://www.regulations.gov/fdmspublic/component/main?main= 
DocumentDetails=FDA-2007-P-0119-0002. 
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ministrative rulemaking in two,5 and a federal district court action.6  All of these 
activities focused on how much information the consumer should have about the 
use of recombinant bovine somatotropin7 (rBST) in dairy herds and how that 
information is conveyed to milk consumers.  rBST is a hormone that increases 
milk production used in dairy cows producing milk for human consumption.8  
Some consumers believe rBST poses human health risks; others believe it harms 
cows; others want to avoid genetically modified material, while some consumers 
do not care about rBST at all. 
Why is rBST controversial?  For two main reasons:  1) it is a genetically 
engineered hormone and 2) it poses health risks to cows treated with it.9  Many 
consumers fear genetically engineered materials in foods because they believe 
there is not enough known about how modifying a food‘s genes will impact hu-
man and environmental health.10  Setting aside whether consumers‘ fears are ra-
tional, these fears are not shared by the FDA.  The FDA first presumed genetical-
ly engineered foods ―generally regarded as safe‖ under the Food, Drug, and 
Cosmetics Act, but later required a premarket clearance procedure – both 
schemes permitting genetically engineered foods into the food supply without a 
mandatory disclosure label.11  The genetically engineered foods issue has mul-
tiple layers – do they harm humans? Our environment? Animals?  Since there are 
few definitive answers to these questions, other than studies confirming safety, 
consumers‘ fears are driven by the unknown.   
  
 4. S.B. 595, 2008 Sess. (Kan. 2008); H.B. 1300, 115th Gen. Assem. 2d Reg. Sess. (Ind. 
2008). 
 5. Pa. Dep‘t of Agric.:  Milk Labeling Standards, 2.0.1.17.08 (Jan. 17, 2008); Ohio 
Emergency Rule, Dairy Labeling, 901:11-8.01 (May 22, 2008). 
 6. Complaint at 1, Int‘l Dairy Foods Ass‘n v. Boggs, No. 08-cv-00628-JLG-NMK 
(E.D. Ohio filed July 7, 2008). 
 7. rBST is a synthetic hormone that increases milk production by as much as 20%. 
Bradford L. Barham & Jeremy Foltz, rBST Adoption in the United States:  That Was the Jugger-
naut…That Wasn’t 17 CHOICES 15, 16 (Summer 2002).  rBST is manufactured only by Monsanto 
and is marketed under the trade name Posilac. Readers should note that Monsanto sets milk produc-
tion increases at 10-15%.  See BST by Posilac, http://www.monsantodairy.com/about/index.html 
(last visited Nov. 1, 2008). 
 8. Robert Collier, Regulation of rBST in the US, 3 AGBIOFORUM 156 (2000).   
 9. Id. at 159.  
 10. See generally Mariella Nocenzi et al., Genetic Modified Organisms:  Confronting 
Needs, Interests, Responsibilities and Fears, 15 INT‘L REV. SOC. 305 (2005); for one consumer 
perspective and an anti-genetic engineering view see ANDREW KIMBRELL, YOUR RIGHT TO KNOW:  
GENETIC ENGINEERING AND THE SECRET CHANGES IN YOUR FOOD (2007). 
 11. Statement of Policy:  Foods Derived from New Plant Verities, 57 Fed. Reg. 22,984 
(May 29, 1992); Proposed Rules:  Premarket Notice Concerning Bioengineered Foods, 66 Fed. 
Reg. 4706 (Jan. 18, 2001).  See also Alliance for Bio-Integrity v. Shalala, 116 F. Supp. 2d 166, 170 
(D.D.C. 2000). 
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The rBST science shows negative side effects on dairy herds.  Specifical-
ly, Monsanto‘s safety studies showed an increased risk of mastitis, twinning 
rates, and injection site infections.12  Yet, the law does not require zero risk to 
animals when approving a new veterinary drug.13  Despite little scientific evi-
dence that genetically engineered foods are unsafe and a legally tolerable risk to 
animals, many consumers still reject rBST as unnatural, unsafe, and undesirable. 
Since many consumers avoid rBST, why would farmers use it?  Simply 
put, it increases milk production.14 Theoretically, a more productive dairy is a 
more profitable one.  rBST is also an innovation and is attractive to farmers who 
want to be competitive.  Finally, farmers use it because Monsanto markets it to 
them.  As any company with a potentially profitable product should, Monsanto 
has sold many farmers on the benefits of rBST.15 
Today‘s dairy farmers face a complex industry – consolidation and or-
ganic production force difficult economic choices.  Milk consumers also face 
difficult choices – conventional? hormone free? organic?  What do these labels 
mean about the choices farmer‘s make when producing the milk?  These ques-
tions and choices exist because of the FDA‘s 1993 approval of rBST.16 Since that 
approval, the dairy industry and consumers have struggled with the consequences 
of rBST milk in the marketplace. 
The current skirmishes over the use of the genetically engineered hor-
mone in US dairy herds are important.  Ultimately, the controversy is about mar-
keting.  Realistically, consumers already have rBST information on milk labels.17 
rBST-free milk carries the statement ―from cows not treated with rBST,‖ fol-
lowed by the disclaimer ―no significant difference has been shown between milk 
derived from rBST-treated and non-rBST treated cows.‖18  However, some pro-
ducers also add claims such as ―no added hormones‖ or ―artificial hormone 
free.‖19  These claims and deviations from the FDA guidelines area are what up-
set Monsanto, farmers who use rBST, and producers.  They believe that the un-
sanctioned claims mislead consumers into believing that rBST-free milk is supe-
 _________________________  
 12. Stauber v. Shalala, 895 F. Supp. 1178, 1183-84 (W.D. Wis. 1995). 
 13. Id. at 1191 (The FDA determined that the risk to animals was ―manageable‖—  
meaning that through appropriate farming techniques the farmers could manage side effects on the 
cows). 
 14. Barham & Foltz, supra note 7, at 15.   
 15. See id.     
 16. See Interim Guidance on the Voluntary Labeling of Milk and Milk Products from 
Cows That Have Not Been Treated with Recombiant Bovine Somatotropin, 59 Fed. Reg. 6279 
(Feb. 10, 1994).  
 17. See id. at 6280. 
 18. Id. 
 19. Complaint, FDA Matter No. 072-3080, supra note 2, at 1, 9. 
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rior or more healthful.20  They are right:  this is exactly what consumers seeking 
out rBST-free milk believe – or what media outlets who cover the issue want the 
public to believe.21 
Early predictions were that consumers would adjust to rBST in milk, but 
the opposite is true.  While it took nearly fifteen years for a clear consumer prefe-
rence for rBST-free milk to emerge in the marketplace – 2008 marked the year 
that it did.  Most milk producers‘ labels adhere to the FDA guidance, including 
the disclaimer.  However, this information has made little difference to consum-
ers.22  Quite the opposite is true:  consumers express a preference for rBST-free 
milk raising the important question:  Why haven‘t consumers embraced the 
FDA‘s rBST safety ruling?  The probable reason is that consumers distrust that 
safety ruling.  The primary reason for the distrust is that rBST is genetically mod-
ified and does pose some health risk to animals. 
Thus, the current controversy pits consumers against producers, unpro-
ven safety concerns against regulatory approval of rBST, and tradition against 
innovation.  There are three things that the industry, consumers, and lawmakers 
could do to solve this problem.  These three things are:  1) conduct consumer 
surveys determining the true extent of consumer confusion and consumer prefe-
rence; 2) conduct consumer research to determine the most effective milk labels 
at providing consumer information; and 3) based on the consumer research of the 
previous two suggestions, make a decision to promote USDA organic milk as the 
one solution for consumers who want rBST-free milk or devise a symbol, similar 
to the USDA organic symbol, that represents rBST-free milk.  Unless the parties 
engage in solutions like these, the controversy will continue. 
II.  WHY DO CONSUMERS CARE? A SHORT HISTORY OF RBST, 1987-2007 
Controversy surrounded rBST from the time Monsanto first applied for it 
as a new animal drug in 1987.23  Many consumers recoiled at the thought of a 
genetically engineered hormone24 being injected into cows to increase milk pro-
 _________________________ 
 20. Id. at 1.  
 21. An internet search for ―rBST‖ results in a plethora of websites that decry rBST use 
and highlight its ―dangers.‖  However, there are no widely publicized consumer studies that indi-
cate what consumers know or believe about rBST.  See id. at 4-5.   
 22. See, e.g., Caren Wilcox, Growth and Challenges Await Organic Dairy, 109 DAIRY 
FOODS 114 (2008).  
 23. See Collier, supra note 8, at 156.  See also 21 U.S.C. § 360b (2006) (mandating new 
animal drugs must be approved by the FDA).   
 24. The history of consumer reaction to genetically modified foods is beyond the scope 
of this article, though I believe that the FDA‘s early presumption that genetically engineered foods 
are ―Generally Regarded As Safe‖ (GRAS) under the Food, Drug, and Cosmetics Act, 21 U.S.C. § 
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duction, even though rBST is indistinguishable in the lab from its natural coun-
terpart, BST.25  Today, consumers‘ concerns about rBST include increased use of 
antibiotics in dairy herds to reduce rBST side effects and animal welfare issues.  
Analysts in the area also often note that the United States is one of the few na-
tions to approve rBST use, with Canada, New Zealand, and Australia banning it, 
and the European Union continuing to restrict its use.26 
A. 1987 – 1994: FDA Approval 
BST is a naturally occurring hormone.27 Scientists discovered that injec-
tions of BST increased milk production as early as the 1930s, though BST pro-
duction was impractical.28  This changed through the 1970s and early 80s, when 
Genentech and Monsanto developed genetically engineered BST – rBST – com-
mercially known as Posilac.29  In 1987, Monsanto applied to the FDA for Posilac 
approval.30  Although there were some side effects for cows, such as increased 
incidence of twins, injection site infections, and a slight increase of mastitis, the 
FDA ruled the ―risks to animal health were not significant‖ and approved Posi-
lac‘s use in cows.31  Because of that decision, today farmers inject cows with 
rBST to increase their milk production.32  
  
321(s) (2006), and subsequent premarket clearance procedure is linked to continued consumer 
concerns about rBST.  For further reading on the topic, see generally Alliance for Bio-Integrity v. 
Shalala, 116 F. Supp. 2d 166, 166 (D.D.C. 2000); Statement of Policy: Foods Derived from Plant 
Varieties, 57 Fed. Reg. 22,984 (May 29, 2001); Mario Teisel et al., Focus Group Reactions to 
Genetically Modified Food Labels, 5 AGBIOFORUM 6 (2002); Nocenzi, et al., supra note 10; 
KIMBRELL, supra note 10. 
 25. John F. Murphy, Mandatory Labeling of Food Made from Cloned Animals:  Grap-
pling with Moral Objections to the Production of Safe Products, 63 FOOD & DRUG L.J. 131, 140-41 
(2008) (analogizing consumer concerns about cloned meat to rBST controversy and noting the 
rBST controversy ―is another poignant example that American consumers have come to care about 
not just merely what is on their plate (or in their glasses), but also how it got there.‖).  See also Lars 
Noah, Managing Biotechnology’s [R]evolution:  Has Guarded Enthusiasm Become Benign Neg-
lect? 11 VA. J.L. & TECH. 4, 40 n.144 (2006) (reviewing history of rBST approval). 
 26. See Dirk Brinkman, The Regulation of rBST:  The European Case, 3 AGBIOFORUM 
164 (2000); Kevin Jones, Constructing rBST in Canada:  Biotechnology, Instability and the Man-
agement of Nature, 25 CAN. J. SOC., 311, 311-41 (2000). 
 27. Collier, supra note 8, at 157 (noting that until Monsanto and Genentech discovered 
how to genetically engineer BST, its commercial production was impractical).  
 28. Id. at 156.   
 29. Id.   
 30. Id.   
 31. Stauber v. Shalala, 895 F.Supp. 1178, 1184 (W.D. Wis. 1995). 
 32. Barham & Foltz, supra note 7, at 15.     
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FDA approval of Posilac was politically and legally controversial.33  Be-
fore the approval was issued, Senator Patrick Leahy of Vermont requested and 
obtained a General Accounting Office (GAO) investigation of FDA actions.34  
The GAO recommended that the FDA withhold approval of Posilac pending fur-
ther research of its ―potential negative impact on human health.‖35  Next, Con-
gress delayed the sale of the drug for 90 days while ―an inter-agency task force 
supervised by the Office of the President reviewed the data upon which the FDA 
based its decision.36  By January 1994, that task force concluded the ―FDA‘s. . . 
[decision] was adequately supported,‖ by evidence, and that Monsanto could 
begin marketing Posilac to dairy farmers.37 
B. 1995, Challenging the Science: Stauber v. Shalala 
The FDA‘s rBST approval methodology and the science behind it sur-
vived judicial review in 1995.38  Consumers brought the action seeking declarato-
ry and injunctive relief against the FDA and seeking to prevent rBST from enter-
ing the human food supply.39  Specifically, the consumer-plaintiffs made claims 
under the Food, Drug, and Cosmetic Act, the Environmental Protection Act, and 
the Administrative Procedure Act.40  The government prevailed at summary 
judgment, primarily because the plaintiffs had no admissible, relevant evidence 
to support their claims because they relied on material never presented to the 
FDA during the Posilac approval process.41 
The consumer claims echoed those raised by the political process and 
GAO investigation:  the FDA did not adequately consider health and safety 
claims, mandatory warning labels should have been required on Posilac packag-
ing to highlight its negative side effects on the animals, and the government 
 _________________________ 
 33. See Nocenzi et al., supra note 10.  See also KIMBRELL, supra note 10.  The history of 
the controversy is beyond the scope of this article, though it is very interesting.  rBST is considered 
the ―first‖ genetically modified substance allowed for human consumption under the FDA‘s policy 
of presumptive safety. Since milk is a cornerstone of American nutrition, especially for children, 
there was likely no worse choice than milk to forge the way for genetically engineered foods.   
 34. Collier, supra note 8, at 158.   
 35. Stauber, 895 F. Supp. at 1183.  
 36. Id. 
 37. Id.  See also Animal Drugs, Feeds, and Related Products; Sterile Sometribove Zinc 
Suspension, 58 Fed. Reg. 59,946 (Nov. 12, 1993) (codified at 21 C.F.R. pts. 510 and 522).  The 
actual approval date was 1993, but the Congressional moratorium on rBST‘s sale did not expire 
until Feb. 3, 1994. 
 38. See Stauber, 895 F. Supp. at 1178. 
 39. Id. at 1182-83. 
 40. Id. at 1182. 
 41. Id. at 1183. 
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should have conducted an environmental impact statement before approving Po-
silac.42  The government‘s position was simply that it complied with the relevant 
law and rules when approving rBST.43 
The Stauber decision revealed some unpleasant realities about milk pro-
duction to the public.  The first concern, which remains one of the biggest today, 
is that use of rBST also increases the use of antibiotics.  Cows then secrete those 
antibiotics into milk sent to market.  Increased human consumption of antibiotics 
does lead to increased antibiotic resistance in humans.44  For example, in 2005, 
the FDA withdrew the use of the antibiotic Baytril in poultry destined for human 
consumption out of concern that humans would develop resistance to one of the 
few drugs effective against biological terrorism materials.45  Consumers avoid 
rBST milk for similar reasons – they are concerned that they are drinking antibio-
tics with their milk, and they may be right. 
rBST-treated cows are often treated with antibiotics to prevent or treat 
the mastitis that can be more frequent in treated cows.  In Stauber, the plaintiffs 
asserted this was a valid safety concern, but the court was not swayed.46  Instead, 
it ruled that the FDA did not rely arbitrarily or capriciously on the USDA milk 
grade testing process to screen out milk that had excessive antibiotic residue.47 
However, the court also acknowledged that, at the time, there were limitations on 
the testing.48  Though the Grade A pasteurized milk standard was rigorous, test-
ing at the time was only for the four most common antibiotics used in dairy 
herds.49  The court acknowledged that over fifty drugs were used to treat cow 
infections, some of them not even approved for use in cows.50 Therefore, unless a 
farmer treating with rBST and antibiotics used one of the four antibiotics tested 
for, consumers could unwittingly drink antibiotic residue from one of the other 
forty-six drugs used but not tested for. 
 _________________________  
 42. Id. at 1182.  
 43. Id. 
 44. See FDA, FINAL DECISION OF THE COMMISSIONER, NO. 2000N-1571, WITHDRAWAL 
OF APPROVAL OF THE NEW ANIMAL DRUG FOR ENROFLOXACIN IN POULTRY 53 (2005), available at 
http://www.fda.gov/oc/antimicrobial/baytril.html. (Baytril is the trade name for Enrofloxacin, a 
fluoroquinolone.  Humans are treated with a similar drug named Cipro).  See also Enrofloxacin for 
Poultry; Final Decision on Withdrawal of New Animal Drug Application Following Formal Evi-
dentiary Public Hearing; Availability, 70 Fed. Reg. 44,105 (Aug. 1, 2005). 
 45. See id; Ellen K. Sibergeld & Polly Walker, What if Cipro Stopped Working, N.Y. 
TIMES, Nov. 3, 2001, at A23. 
 46. Stauber, 895 F. Supp. at 1192. 
 47. Id. 
 48. Id. 
 49. Id.  
 50. Id. at 1184. 
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Indeed the court acknowledged ―[b]ecause the current regulatory scheme 
does not detect the presence of all drug residues in dairy products, there is a risk 
that greater amounts of antibiotic drug residue will be ingested by human dairy 
consumers.‖51  This is not exactly reassuring for the dairy consuming public, yet 
it illustrates the weakness of the consumers‘ case:  they could not produce evi-
dence to support their health and safety concerns.  Even more damaging to con-
sumers‘ claims was the fact that there was no long-term study of whether antibio-
tics in milk affected human health at all.52 
The court also touched on other specific differences in rBST milk that 
consumers claimed were significant, yet the FDA ruled immaterial.53 Specific 
consumer concerns were:  higher somatic cell (white blood cell) counts in milk 
and higher insulin growth factor (IGF-1) levels.54  In both cases, the court found 
no evidence to support the consumers‘ claims.55  Since the FDA had reviewed 
Monsanto‘s studies on somatic cell count that showed no significant increase in 
the rBST milk, the Court ruled the FDA had done its job.56  As for IGF-1, since 
Monsanto had not done any studies on human health but could present evidence 
that there was no impact on the digestive tract in a two-week rat study, the court 
found the FDA had also acted reasonably on this issue.57 
Stauber upheld the FDA‘s approval of Posilac, though it is reasonable to 
conclude that the court could do little more given the standard of review and the 
fact that the plaintiffs‘ evidence had not been reviewed during the FDA approval 
process.  The court considered only whether the FDA had acted arbitrarily or 
capriciously, abused its discretion, or otherwise acted outside the law.58 Given the 
close scrutiny that the rBST approval process had already survived, including the 
GAO review, it is difficult to imagine any other ruling.  In fact, the true issue was 
science – or more accurately stated, the lack thereof.  This is especially so be-
cause the FDA has scientific expertise, entitling its evaluation of the science to 
great deference by the court.59 
The plaintiffs did submit scientific evidence to the Stauber court.60  The 
problem was that the same evidence had not been presented to the FDA during 
 _________________________ 
 51. Id. at 1185. 
 52. Id. 
 53. Id.  
 54. Id. at 1185, 1193. 
 55. Id.  
 56. Id. 
 57. Id. at 1185. 
 58. Id. at 1189 (citing Upjohn Mfg. v. Schweiker, 681 F.2d 480, 483 (6th Cir. 1982)). 
 59. See id. (discussing deference afforded agency decisions). 
 60. Id. at 1190. 
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the drug review and thus could not be considered by the court.61  As a result, the 
Court found that the FDA‘s process was sound, even when it decided to rely on 
testing process for grading milk to make sure antibiotic residue was kept out of 
the milk supply.62 The Stauber case raises many unsettling points about what was 
truly known about rBST and its effect on humans when it was approved.   
However, the fact is that rBST has been on the market for almost fifteen 
years without consumers returning to convince the FDA that it was wrong when 
it found rBST ―has no significant effect on the overall composition of milk.‖63  
Since the FDA concluded that there was no compositional difference between 
milk from rBST treated cows and those that are not, there is no legal basis for the 
FDA to label the milk.64  As Stauber recognized ―the FDA does consider con-
sumer opinion relevant when determining whether a label is required to disclose 
a material fact.‖65 As a result, absent scientific proof that rBST milk is materially 
different from rBST-free milk, consumers have no right to know whether it has 
been used to produce milk, as Vermont found in 1996.66 
C. 1996 Commercial Speech (Round One): Int‘l Dairy Foods Ass‘n v. Amestoy 
Posilac‘s next challenge came from Vermont‘s law mandating disclosure 
of rBST use on the milk label or on the grocery store shelf.67  The Vermont regu-
lation mandated a sign at the dairy case stating:   
The products in this case that contain or may contain milk from rBST-treated cows 
either (1) state on the package that rBST has been or may have been used, or (2) are 
identified by a blue shelf label like this [blue rectangle], or (3) a blue sticker on the 
package like this [blue dot].68 
Dairy producers, represented by the International Dairy Foods Associa-
tion, moved for a preliminary injunction against implementing the law, which the 
district court denied finding there was no irreparable harm to dairy producers.69  
Overruling the district court, the Second Circuit rejected the law for many of the 
 _________________________  
 61. Id. 
 62. Id. at 1192.  
 63. Id. at 1193. 
 64. Id. 
 65. Id. 
 66. See Int‘l Dairy Foods Ass‘n v. Amestoy, 92 F.3d 67, 74 (2d Cir. 1996). 
 67. Id. at 69-70.   
 68. Id. at 70.   
 69. Id.   
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same reasons Stauber upheld FDA‘s approval – there was simply no scientific 
evidence of material difference in the record, regardless of consumer concerns.70  
Vermont‘s statute requiring farmers to label milk from rBST-treated 
cows illustrates the strength of consumer concern in Vermont,71 but the pro-
consumer statute was simply an unconstitutional restriction on commercial 
speech. Specifically, the Second Circuit held that consumer interest alone was 
insufficient to allow regulation of commercial speech under Central Hudson.72  
When striking down the law, the court ruled that if consumer interest alone were 
enough, ―there is no end to the information that states could require manufactur-
ers to disclose about their production methods.‖73  
The district court originally upheld Vermont‘s mandatory disclosure law, 
reasoning that there was no irreparable harm to the producers based primarily on 
the economic impact of the labels.74  The Second Circuit found fault with this 
economic analysis primarily because the law caused irreparable harm by requir-
ing producers to make an involuntary statement, though true, in order to offer 
their products for sale (regardless of economic impact).75  However, the most 
instructive part of the case is the court‘s ruling that the Vermont law failed the 
Central Hudson standard because the state lacked a substantial interest.76 Despite 
the political controversy over rBST prior to FDA approval, the court emphasized 
that producers could not be required to disclose its use in cows absent ―reasona-
ble concern for human health or safety or some other sufficiently substantial gov-
ernment concern.‖77  The court left it to ―those consumers interested in such in-
formation [to] exercise the power of their purses by buying products from manu-
facturers who voluntarily reveal it.‖78 However, when the court left consumers to 
 _________________________ 
 70. Id. at 74.   
 71. Id. at 69.   
 72. Id. at 74; see also Cent. Hudson Gas & Elec. Corp. v. Pub. Serv. Comm‘n of N.Y., 
447 U.S. 557, 566 (1980) (―In commercial speech cases, then, a four-part analysis has developed. 
At the outset, we must determine whether the expression is protected by the First Amendment. For 
commercial speech to come within that provision, it at least must concern lawful activity and not be 
misleading. Next, we ask whether the asserted governmental interest is substantial. If both inquiries 
yield positive answers, we must determine whether the regulation directly advances the govern-
mental interest asserted, and whether it is not more extensive than is necessary to serve that inter-
est.‖). 
 73. Int‘l Dairy Foods Ass‘n v. Amestoy, 92 F.3d 67, 74 (2d Cir. 1996) This position 
may not take into account the role of preemption in manufactured food-labeling requirements under 
the FDCA. 
 74. Id. at 70-71. 
 75. See id. at 71. 
 76. Id. at 73. 
 77. Id. at 74.  
 78. Id. 
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the power of their purses, it left regulators to consider how consumers exercise 
that power.  As the court wrote, ―consumer curiosity alone is not a strong enough 
state interest to sustain the compulsion of even an accurate, factual statement.‖79 
Where does this leave the consumer who is skeptical of rBST safety and curious 
enough to continue reading labels?  It leaves her with voluntary disclosure, which 
remains at the heart of the controversy today. 
D. 1994 to Present: Producers Safe Harbor – FDA Milk Label Guidance 
What can producers voluntarily reveal about rBST-free milk on labels?  
In 1994, the FDA labeling guidelines advised manufacturers who label milk 
―from cows not treated with rBST‖ to include the disclaimer with the statement 
that ―‗No significant difference has been shown between milk derived from 
rbST-treated and non-rbST-treated cows.‘‖80  The FDA label guidance is 
straightforward and intended to protect against consumers having the impression 
that rBST-free milk is superior or more nutritious than milk from cows treated 
with rBST.  
The FDA‘s notice clearly stated that it was not binding on the FDA or 
any state, nor did it create any rights for individuals.81  The guidance was simply 
the FDA‘s interpretation of the law and it reserved the right to change its inter-
pretation should it receive compelling comments.82 The guidance contains rele-
vant advice to the current label controversy when it counsels:  ―States should 
evaluate any labeling statement about rBST in the context of the complete label 
and all labeling for the product, as well as any advertising for the product.  
Available data on consumers‘ perceptions of the label statements could also be 
used to determine whether a statement is misleading.‖83 
The guidance also suggested ways that states could insure that claims 
were valid – such as recordkeeping by producers or third party certification.84  
Today, the 1994 guidance remains the same.  Its purpose also remains the same – 
 _________________________  
 79. Id. (citing Riley v. Nat‘l Fed. of the Blind, 487 U.S. 781, 797-98 (1988)). 
 80. Interim Guidance on the Voluntary Labeling of Milk and Milk Products from Cows 
that Have Not Been Treated with Recombinant Bovine Somatotropin, 59 Fed. Reg. 6279, 6280 
(Feb. 10, 1994) (providing guidance to dairy industry with the intent to preclude ―rBST-free labels‖ 
from giving consumers the impression that milk from rBST treated cows is somehow unsafe or less 
healthful than rBST-free). 
 81. Id. 
 82. Id. 
 83. Id. 
 84. Id. 
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to support the legally valid conclusion that there is no material difference be-
tween milk from rBST treated cows and milk from those that are not.85 
Despite the label requirement meant to inform consumers that there is no 
difference between rBST-free and conventional milk, in 2007, several major 
dairy marketers informed producers that they would no longer accept milk from 
cows treated with rBST.86  Marketers took the action because consumers were 
demanding ―hormone free‖ milk, but ―they will not accept any price increases for 
this milk.‖87  This is not a small consumer movement. Large distributors such as 
Publix and Kroger announced that their store brand milk would be hormone-
free.88   
E. 2006 -2008, The rBST-free Market Emerges 
The market demand for rBST-free milk has consequences for farmers.  In 
one case, a state tried to use milk price controls to protect farmers who use 
rBST.89  In 2006, the New Jersey Department of Agriculture attempted to fix a 
milk price premium for rBST-free milk.90  Specifically, processors were demand-
ing rBST-free milk from farmers without agreeing to pay farmers voluntary pre-
miums.  As a result, farmers using rBST had a choice: either abandon it with 
reduced production or continue to use it and accept a lower price for the milk.91  
At the premium‘s public hearing, one farmer relied on a Monsanto produced 
pamphlet to testify that there was a ―hypothetical loss‖ of $0.76 per hundred-
weight for rBST-free milk.92  Based in part on that testimony, the Director made 
the following findings: 
 _________________________ 
 85. Id. 
 86. DairyBusiness Communications, Dairy Technology Restrictions Move Toward 
Deadlines, VOICES FOR CHOICES, July 31, 2007, at 4, available at http://www.dairybusiness.com/ 
voicesforchoices/pdf/vfe-newsletter-7.31.pdf.  
 87. Id. 
 88. Id.; Kroger Rejects GMO Milk:  The Tipping Point, ENVIRONMENTAL NEWS 
NETWORK, Aug. 7, 2007, available at http://www. enn.com/agriculture/article/21413/print. 
 89. See generally In re Sept. 28, 2006 Order of Dir. of the Div. of Mktg. and Dev., No. 
A-827-06T1, 2006 WL 3783503 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. Dec. 27, 2006). 
 90. Id. at *1. 
 91. Id. at *2.  For example, a year after the New Jersey case, the American Farm Bureau 
Federation Quarterly Marketbasket Survey for the second quarter of 2007 indicated three levels of 
pricing for wholesale milk ½ gallons:  regular whole, $2.22; rBST-free $3.01; organic $3.65.  Dai-
ryBusiness Communications, ‘Niche Market’ Milk Drawing Premium Price, VOICES FOR CHOICES, 
July 31, 2007, at 1, available at http://www.dairybusiness.com/voicesforchoices/pdf/VfC-
newsletter-7.31.pdf. 
 92. In re Sept. 28, 2006 Order of Dir. Of the Div. of Mktg. and Dev., No. A-827-06T1, 
at *3. 
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Posilac results in increased milk production; the processors demand ―rBST-free‖ 
milk; negotiations over premiums for ―rBST-free milk‖ were difficult; and ―rBST-
free‖ milk is a value added product. . . .[A] processor demanding ―rBST-free‖ milk 
should be obligated to cover at least the costs of production.93 
Based on these findings, the Director did impose a $0.76 per hundredweight 
premium for rBST free milk.94  On appeal, the court vacated the premium be-
cause the Director‘s decision rested on hypothetical, not actual, data.95  However, 
the Court did not preclude the Director from conducting additional hearings on 
premiums for ―rBST-free‖ milk.96 
New Jersey did hold additional hearings.  In late 2007 and early 2008, 
the Director held hearings on both a fuel premium and the rBST premium.97  He 
concluded that there ―is evidence on either side of the issue of whether an rBST 
premium should be imposed.‖98  Since the evidence could not clearly establish 
whether rBST-free milk was a value added product that warranted a price pre-
mium, the Director declined to impose one.99  Rather, because of the inadequate 
evidence, he decided it was not an appropriate time to interfere with the mar-
ket.100   
Despite the FDA‘s position on rBST‘s safety, consumer demand for 
rBST- free milk currently drives the market.  There is also growing evidence that, 
despite the FDA‘s ―no material difference‖ stance, how milk is produced plays a 
key role in its nutritional quality.  For example, in June 2008 a published study 
showed that organic and low-input organic milk had higher levels of key nu-
trients. 101 Though the study did not specifically examine rBST use, many con-
 _________________________  
 93. Id. at *4. 
 94. Id. 
 95. Id. at *6. 
 96. Id. at *7. 
 97. Letter from Alfred Murray, Dir., Div. of Mktg. & Dev., NJ Dept. of Agric. Mkts. & 
Dev. to Nina Mitchell Wells, Sec‘y of State, at 1 (April 10, 2008). 
 98. Id. 
 99. Id. at 1-2. 
 100. Id. 
 101. Gillian Butler et al., Fatty Acid and Fat-Soluble Antioxidant Concentrations in Milk 
from High-and Low-Input Conventional and Organic Systems:  Seasonal Variation, 88 J. SCI. FOOD 
AGRIC. 1431 (2008). The study compared dairy operations in the United Kingdom using either 
high-input or low-input organic farming methods.  Low-input and organic milk had higher nutrient 
quality, including beneficial fatty acids.  High-input methods resulted in fewer key nutrients, even 
in cases where the herd was supplemented with vitamins.  Specifically, high-input operations sup-
plementing with Vitamin E did not produce milk with higher levels of Vitamin than low-input 
operations not supplementing.  It is important to note that this study does not examine rBST, but I 
have little doubt that it will be used to support the argument that ―naturally‖ produced milk is supe-
rior, including arguments against rBST. 
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sumers will undoubtedly interpret its findings to supporting their sentiment that 
rBST-free milk is superior because it is more natural.  
III. FALSE AND MISLEADING? FEDERAL TRADE COMMISSION ACTIONS 
In 2007, several dairies‘ interpretation of the FDA guidance led Monsan-
to to complain to the Federal Trade Commission that the rBST-free labeling used 
in many markets misleads consumers.102  This was not Monsanto‘s first effort to 
curb rBST-free labeling.103  In 2003, Monsanto challenged Oakhurst Dairy over 
its labels claiming ―No Artificial Growth Hormones‖ in federal court.104 In 2007, 
Monsanto and various dairy producers complained to the FTC that those produc-
ers making claims such as ―cows are not injected with BST (hormones)‖ and 
―The Natural Milk – No Added BST (hormones)‖ were misleading consumers 
because the labels conflicted with the FDA labeling guidance.105  The complaint 
maintains that statements about hormone-free milk mislead the consumer into 
believing that milk from cows not treated with rBST is superior or more nutri-
tious.106 
Monsanto‘s FTC complaint was right in one significant way – many con-
sumers believe that milk from rBST free cows is more desirable (or there would 
not be a market for the milk).107  Whether this is a result of the marketing practic-
es complained of by Monsanto to the FTC  – or whether it is the persistence of 
the consumer concerns in existence since rBST was approved is unknown.  How-
ever, this consumer preference should signal label regulators that consumers do 
not believe the FDA rBST safety ruling. 
 _________________________ 
 102. Complaint, FDA Matter, No. 072-3080, surpa note 2 at 1. 
 103. Petition for Plaintiff at 1, Monsanto Co. v. Oakhurst Dairy, No. 03-11273 (D. Mass. 
filed July 3, 2003).  
 104. Id. 
 105. See Complaint, FDA Matter No. 072-3080, supra note 2, at 5.   
 106. See id.  See also Butler, supra note 101, at 1435.  It is significant to note that in June 
2008, a study was published showing that the nutritional value of organic milk and low-input non-
organic milk was higher than conventional. Certainly, this study while not specifically identifying 
rBST as unsafe, will add to consumer sentiment that rBST free milk is indeed superior.  But see, 
DairyBusiness Communications, A Fair Question:  Who Is Asking for rBST-free Milk?, VOICES FOR 
CHOICES, Sept. 25, 2007, at 4, available at http://www.dairybusiness.com/voicesforchoices/pdf/ 
VfC.9.25.pdf (questioning whether consumers really care about rBST in milk). 
 107. See Dairy Business Communications, ‘Niche Market’ Milk Drawing Premium Price, 
VOICES FOR CHOICES, July 31, 2007, at 1 available at http://www.dairybusiness.com/voicesfor 
choices/pdf/VfC-newsletter-7.31.pdf. 
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On August 21, 2007, the FTC responded to the Monsanto request for ac-
tion against false and misleading rBST labels.108  The FTC noted that Monsanto 
was aware that the milk producers had the right to inform consumers about 
whether the milk was produced using rBST or not.109  Further, the FTC informed 
Monsanto that it had independently reviewed websites and other marketing in 
light of the 1994 FDA Guidance and with FDA staff.110  The FTC concurred with 
the FDA policy that producers could label rBST-free, as long as ―in the context 
of the entire label, they do not mislead consumers to believe that milk from cows 
not treated with rBST is safer or of higher quality.‖111  The FTC‘s response letter 
also acknowledges that there may be reasons that producers want to advertise as 
rBST- free other than safety or quality – and that it is permissible so long as con-
sumers are not misled.  The primary example of ―other reasons‖ is animal wel-
fare. 
Ultimately, the FTC ruled that its staff ―did not find any examples of na-
tional or significant regional advertising campaigns that made express or implied 
claims linking rBST to human health or safety.‖112 While the FTC did note some 
unfounded rBST claims, it advised companies engaging in such claims to revise 
their marketing.113  Given that the companies appeared cooperative and there was 
no evidence of widespread consumer confusion, the FTC declined action.114   
In order to understand better the FTC‘s decision, a slight digression is 
appropriate.  In 2008, Sanderson Farms sued Tyson Foods for misleading con-
sumers with its ―Raised without Antibiotics Claim‖ used on Tyson‘s chicken.115 
That claim carried the qualifying language ―that impact antibiotic resistance in 
humans.‖116  The marketing claim was a phenomenal success, with two problems 
– it was not USDA approved, nor was it accurate.117  While the Tyson‘s farmers 
may have ―raised‖ chicks without antibiotics, Tyson‘s label did not disclose the 
fact that while in their shells chicks were injected with antibiotics and later fed a 
type of antibiotic known as ionophores.118  Additionally, the no antibiotics 
claim‘s qualifying language ―that impact antibiotic resistance in humans‖ had no 
 _________________________  
 108. See Letter from Mary K. Engle, Assoc. Dir., Div. of Adver. Practices, FTC, to Jodie 
Z. Bernstein, Esq., Dana B. Rosenfeld, Esq., Bryan Cave L.L.P. (Aug. 21, 2007), available at 
http://www.ftc.gov/os/closings/staff/070821monsanto.pdf. 
 109. Id. 
 110. Id. 
 111. Id. 
 112. Id. 
 113. Id. 
 114. See id. 
 115. Sanderson Farms v. Tyson Foods, Inc., 547 F. Supp. 2d 491, 492 (D. Md. 2008). 
 116. Id. 
 117. Id. at 494. 
 118. Id. at 492. 
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significant meaning to consumers.119  As a result, the court ruled that the label 
claims were literally false.120 
To prove their case, Sanderson and its co-plaintiff Perdue presented sig-
nificant evidence of consumer confusion to the court.121   Specifically, the court 
relied on the various consumer survey methodologies employed by the plaintiffs‘ 
experts when ruling the labels were misleading.122  Experts found 63.4% of sur-
vey respondents thought the label claim meant no antibiotics had been used 
(when they had), and that 54.9% of consumers disregarded the qualifying lan-
guage ―that impact antibiotic resistance in humans.‖123  These statistics, and the 
testimony of Tyson‘s own expert that ―these figures far exceed the level of con-
sumer survey evidence usually required by courts‖ to establish a Lanham Act 
violation, lead the court to rule in favor of the plaintiffs.124 
When issuing the injunction and putting an end to the labels, the court 
wrote: 
Having heard testimony for four days and having reviewed hundreds of exhibits, 
this Court is convinced by a preponderance of the evidence that a substantial percen-
tage of consumers are misled by Defendant‘s advertisements carrying the message 
―Raised Without Antibiotics that impact antibiotic resistance in humans.‖ The quali-
fying language does not appear to serve its intended purpose-the consumer is still 
led to believe that Defendant does not use antibiotics, when in fact Defendant uses 
ionophores in its chicken feed and injects its chicken eggs with antibiotics. Indeed, 
the qualification may only serve to reinforce that Defendant‘s chicken is ―Raised 
Without Antibiotics,‖ a claim that is literally false.125  
This digression is relevant to rBST because, throughout the years of 
claims of consumer confusion on both sides, no proceeding has produced the 
type of survey evidence that was so compelling in the Tyson case.  In order to 
resolve the rBST controversy, such data will be not only helpful, but essential. 
IV. SAFE OR NOT?  FOOD AND DRUG ADMINISTRATION PETITION 
Just 12 days before Monsanto and producers complained to the FTC 
about the unfair marketing practices, the FDA received a petition seeking the 
withdrawal of Posilac‘s approval or action requiring a cancer risk-warning label 
 _________________________ 
 119. Id. at 505. 
 120. Id. 
 121. Id. at 499-502.   
 122. Id. at 502-03. 
 123. Id. at 504. 
 124. Id. 
 125. Id. at 505. 
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on milk from rBST treated cows.126 The petitioners are the Cancer Prevention 
Coalition, Organic Consumers Association, and Family Farm Defenders.127   
Citing scientific literature, the petitioners claim that rBST milk is, in fact, 
abnormal.128  The petitioners claim rBST milk has:  1) reduced casein,129 2) dif-
ferent fatty acid composition, 3) higher thyroid hormones, 4) antibiotic residue 
from treatment of mastitis,130 and 5) more frequent pus cells due to mastitis.131  
Additionally, the petition‘s greatest emphasis is on insulin growth factor (IGF-1).  
IGF-1 is a protein hormone that is statistically higher in rBST-treated milk.132  
When the FDA approved Posilac, ―not much was known about the hormone.‖133  
However, petitioners assert that now, some fourteen years later, ―[i]ncreased le-
vels of IGF-1 have been shown to increase risks of breast cancer by up-to seven 
fold in 22 publications. . .risks of colon cancer in 16 publications. . .and prostate 
cancer in 10 publications. . . .‖134 Many of the publications cited were published 
after 1994, though the petition does not specifically claim that they link rBST in 
milk and human cancer rates.135 
To date, the FDA has taken no action on the petition.  When and if it 
does, as Amestoy and Stauber held years ago, action must be based on scientific 
evidence, not consumer preferences.  In the absence of scientific evidence of 
material differences in rBST-free and conventional milk attributable to Posilac, it 
is unlikely that the law would permit revocation of Posilac or require cancer-risk 
warnings.  Rather than waiting for the FDA outcome and relying on FTC to 
counsel wayward dairies, the rBST controversy has moved to the states. 
 _________________________  
 126. Petition for Labeling of Products Produced with Posilac, supra note 3, at 1. 
 127. Id. 
 128. See generally id. 
 129. Id. at 2. Casein is a protein that comes from milk‘s reaction with rennet (Enzymes 
used to digest milk) resulting in the milk separating into cords and whey.  Casein is used in cheese, 
paint, and plastic. 
 130. See Stauber v. Shalala, 895 F. Supp. 1178, 1184-85 (W.D. Wis. 1995) One way a 
consumer can avoid most antibiotic residue is to purchase USDA organic milk. 
 131. Petition for Labeling of Products Produced with Posilac, supra note 3, at 3. 
 132. See id.   
 133. See Stauber, 895 F. Supp. at 1185 (noting that ―defendants have done no long term 
studies on the effects of increased levels of IGF-1 on human health.‖). 
 134. Petition for Labeling of Products Produced with Posilac, supra note 3, at 3. 
 135. Id. at 3-8. 
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V. COMMERCIAL SPEECH, ROUND TWO:  CURRENT LEGISLATION AND 
RULEMAKING 
Four states considered further specific guidance on rBST-free milk labels 
in 2008: Indiana,136 Ohio,137 Kansas,138 and Pennsylvania.139 All four state actions 
are similar.  Indiana and Kansas would ban any dairy product claim related to 
composition that lab analysis could not confirm or claims supported only by affi-
davits or testimonials.140   Pennsylvania bases its rBST mislabeling review on 
―the entirety of the particular label under review.‖141  Ohio goes one step further 
by specifically barring compositional claims such as ―No Hormone,‖ ―Hormone 
Free,‖ ―rBST-free,‖ ―rbGH-free,‖ and ―bST Free‖ and classifying such claims as 
―false and misleading.‖142  While these initiatives are largely consistent with the 
1994 FDA compliance guidelines for rBST, one is much more specific (and re-
strictive). 
The Ohio rule is a radical enough departure from the 1994 FDA Guid-
ance, that the International Dairy Foods Association is seeking an injunction 
against it.143 Specifically, the regulation only permits the words ―this milk is from 
cows not supplemented with rBST.‖144  It then goes on to require a contiguous 
disclaimer, rather than use of an asterisk to make the disclaimer elsewhere on the 
packaging (as is the current prevalent practice).145  Finally, the Ohio rule also 
mandates font size, color, and type to match the permitted statement.146  The rule 
 _________________________ 
 136. See H.B. 1300, 115th Gen. Assem., 2d Reg. Sess. (Ind. 2008). 
 137. Ohio Emergency Rule, Dairy Labeling, 901:11-8-01 (May 22, 2008). 
 138. See S.B. 595, 2008 Sess. (Kan. 2008). 
 139. Pa. Dep‘t. of Agric., Milk Labeling Standards 2.0.1.17.08 (proposed Jan. 17, 2008) 
The proposed standard was postponed by Pennsylvania Governor Rendell due to consumer de-
mands for continued rBST-free labels. 
 140. See S.B. 595, 2008 Sess. (Kan. 2008); H.B. 1300 115th Gen. Assem., 2d Reg. Sess. 
(Ind. 2008).  
 141. Pa. Dep‘t. of Agric., Milk Labeling Standards 2.0.1.17.08 (Proposed Jan. 17, 2008). 
 142. Ohio Emergency Rule, Dairy Labeling, 901:11-8-01 (May 22, 2008). 
 143. Complaint at 1, Int‘l Dairy Foods Ass‘n v. Boggs, No. 08-cv-00628-JLG-NMK, 
supra note 6. 
 144. Ohio Emergency Rule, Dairy Labeling, § 901:11-8-01 (B) (May 12, 2008) (stating 
―A dairy label which contains a production claim that ‗this milk is from cows not supplemented 
with rbST‘ (or a substantially equivalent claim) will be considered misleading on the basis of such 
language, unless. . .‖ and the rule goes on to require documentation and is accompanied ―in the 
same label panel, in exactly the same font, style, case, size and color as the foregoing representa-
tion, the following contiguous additional statement (or a substantially equivalent statement):  ‗The 
FDA has determined that no significant difference has been shown between milk derived from 
rbST-supplemented and non-rbST-supplemented cows.‘‖). 
 145. Id. 
 146. Id. 
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is more restrictive than any other state or federal rBST-free label guidance.  Ohio 
argues that its labels are necessary to avoid consumer confusion. 
Boggs is the mirror image of Amestoy the − Vermont case finding man-
datory disclosure of rBST use an unconstitutional commercial speech restriction.  
While in Amestoy farmers fought for their right to remain silent about production 
methods,147  today farmers are fighting for their right to announce production 
methods.  Unlike Vermont‘s desire to make sure consumers knew if milk con-
tained rBST, Ohio wants consumers to know that rBST milk is no different from 
conventional.  However, the IFDA argues that the Ohio rule cannot survive its 
challenge because there is no evidence that the current labels, compliant with the 
1994 FDA Guidance, are false and misleading.148  IFDA‘s argument is a good 
one because absent consumer surveys showing confusion or an FTC finding 
(which we already know was not forthcoming) of false and misleading, Ohio has 
little evidence to support its position. 
Consumer confusion is not a substantial state interest in the commercial 
speech context.149  Thus, even if the Court is persuaded that the current labels are 
false and misleading, Ohio‘s rule will still have to survive Central Hudson analy-
sis.  This will be difficult without more compelling disclosure of the govern-
ment‘s motives.  As the litigation currently stands, the IFDA rests on the press 
releases from the Ohio Department of Agriculture (ODA) that point to consumer 
confusion as the ―substantial interest‖ that justifies the new rule.  Absent better 
evidence of consumer confusion, this is unlikely to constitute a ―substantial inter-
est‖ – even if it did, Amestoy calls into question whether any regulation solely 
based on consumer concern can survive Central Hudson analysis.150 
Obviously, Ohio has an additional concern – one that it should not be 
afraid to herald – the dairy industry.  The interests here are two-fold:  allowing 
farmers to maximize their production and indirectly, promoting the acceptance of 
Posilac, which is after all, an FDA-approved drug.  It is safe for animals (though 
it is not a zero tolerance standard) and safe for human consumption – or at least 
that is what the science showed in 1994.  Since conventional milk is also cheaper, 
Ohio‘s rule could also be viewed as protecting the consumer by supporting those 
farmers who choose to use rBST, and thus produce cheaper milk.  In this time of 
rising food costs such a goal is substantial. 
 _________________________  
 147. Compare Int‘l Dairy Foods Ass‘n v. Amestoy, 92 F.3d 67, 67 (2d Cir. 1996), with 
Complaint at 22, Int‘l Dairy Foods Ass‘n v. Boggs, No. 2:08-cv-00628-JLG-NMK, supra note 6. 
 148. See Complaint at 22, Int‘l Dairy Foods Ass‘n v. Boggs, No. 2:08-cv-00628-JLG-
NMK, supra note 6. 
 149. Int’l Diary Foods Ass’n, 92 F.3d at 74 (citing Riley v. Nat‘l Fed. of the Blind, 487 
U.S. 781, 797-98 (1988)). 
 150. See Int’l Diary Foods Ass’n, 92 F.3d at 74. 
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Boggs also raises commerce clause issues as well as administrative law 
concerns relating to the enactment of an emergency rule.  The court has sche-
duled the parties to submit summary judgment arguments in August 2008.  Those 
filings will determine whether Ohio can be more restrictive than the FDA guid-
ance, but it will not resolve the underlying labeling issue. 
The convergence of the FTC labeling complaint, FDA petition to with-
draw Posilac approval, and state action against rBST-free labels is troubling.  
This type of consumer-driven controversy is not supposed to happen.  Consumers 
are supposed to accept the FDA‘s rBST safety ruling as clear proof that it is safe 
for human consumption and that its risk to animal welfare is acceptable.151  Con-
sumers are supposed to buy organic milk if they want milk free of genetically 
engineered materials – not demand that conventional milk come clean.  Further, 
industry – whether producers or manufacturers of products that support producers 
– is supposed to respond to market forces by changing the product offered, not 
seeking legislation against the consumer.  The activity surrounding rBST in all 
parts of the milk market should indicate to government regulators either that con-
sumers are truly misinformed or that government approval of rBST was a mis-
take.   
VI. GOT SOLUTIONS?  REGULATORS AND INDUSTRY SHOULD 
The history of rBST, and the fact that it is repeating itself, should prompt 
lawmakers, regulators, and industry to move beyond the current regulatory 
schemes.  Specifically, there should be an effort to understand consumers‘ per-
ceptions of rBST, similar to the evidence presented in the Tyson case.152  Next, 
there should be study of what label design is most effective for consumers and 
producers.  Once these two steps are taken, lawmakers can determine how to 
modify the FDA guidance and similar state provisions.  One method might be a 
federal decision to abandon the guidelines and rely on the USDA organic symbol 
to help consumers find rBST-free milk.  Another solution is to devise an rBST-
free symbol similar to the USDA organic logo.   
Altering milk labels will not be an easy task and will face opposition. 
Unless the FDA takes the bold step of reviewing rBST safety, consumer concerns 
about rBST milk will remain.  In the FDA‘s defense, without compelling scientif-
ic evidence that rBST approval was a mistake there is little that they can do to 
remove it from the milk supply. As state regulators and producers rigidly adhere 
to rBST‘s safety determination, consumers seem to have grown more distrustful 
 _________________________ 
 151. See Stauber v. Shalala, 895 F. Supp. 11178, 1184 (W.D. Wis. 1995) (stating that the 
standard is acceptable risk, not zero tolerance).  
 152. See generally Sanderson Farms v. Tyson, 547 F. Supp. 2d 491, 491 (D. Md. 2008). 
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of rBST.  Since the market for rBST milk has rapidly decreased, wholesalers and 
retailers alike demand farmers discontinue rBST use.  The existence of a market 
for ―rBST-free milk,‖ − that is not organic milk, but not conventional milk − 
should tell regulators that milk labels are not providing the best information to 
consumers.  A potential middle ground exists in the creation of an rBST-free 
symbol that is not accompanied by text.   
The activity surrounding rBST in all parts of the milk market should in-
dicate to government regulators that there is a significant information imbalance 
that affects both producers and consumers.153  To resolve the controversy, all par-
ties need to understand exactly what consumers want and what they understand 
about rBST.  While generalizations can be made and interest groups can advocate 
for the generic ―consumer,‖ the parties should understand that consumer survey 
data is the most reliable way to design rBST-free labels.  Unless there is better 
understanding of how consumers perceive the information on milk labels, the 
controversy will continue. 
 
 _________________________  
 153. Cf. Press Release, Tyson Foods, Tyson to Withdraw Qualified Raised Without Anti-
biotics Chicken Label; Company Calls for Public Process to Address Regulatory Confusion (June 
2, 2008), http://www.tyson.com/corporate/press room/viewarticle.aspx?id=2955&print=true.  Ty-
son stood to make millions on its ―raised without antibiotics‖ poultry label claim.  Rather than 
spend millions fighting about the labels in court or with the USDA, on June 3, 2008, Tyson foods 
announced that it was withdrawing its qualified ―Raised without Antibiotics Label.‖  The compa-
ny‘s press release declared: 
We still support the idea of marketing chicken raised without antibiotics because we 
know it‘s what most consumers want. . . .[h]owever,. . . to preserve the integrity of our 
label and our reputation as a premier company in the food industry, we believe there 
needs to be more specific labeling and advertising protocols developed to ensure the rules 
are clear and application of the rules is equitable. 
 
       While the Tyson antibiotic label litigation undoubtedly carried costly legal expenses and nega-
tive press that Tyson chose to withhold production information was in hopes of clearer regulation is 
not an optimal outcome for consumers (or producers).   
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